War the world has seen a host of conflicts arise in areas that had once been kept quiet as a result of superpower competition.
World tensions have evolved into regional tensions in which conflicts rage mostly around ethnic and religious differences.
Our current national military strategy cites peace enforcement operations as one of the potential types of missions our armed forces may perform. 3 However, we must understand that such operations are not merely another form of military maneuver or a police action. These operations are a strategic response to unique phenomena that require an understanding of its nature.
The use of US armed forces in PEOs places those forces in circumstances that could result in armed conflict with one or more belligerent forces. Employing US forces in a PEO is, to paraphrase Clausewitz's view of war, the result of the continuation of US policy with other means.
The purpose of this paper is to examine current US doctrine Consequently, the clarity and appropriateness of policy are left to the standards of those making the policy.
Clausewitz's warning is that policy ought to the rational factor in the complex equation of war.
Among the many factors active in war, several operate outside the bounds of direct human control. Clausewitz referred to them as danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance. 6 Gaining some semblance of control over these climatic elements is the duty of the commander. The commander must exercise his genius through creativity and rational thought, which can be very difficult even when the solution to the issue seems near at hand.
As the government develops its policy regarding an issue, it must decide its ultimate goal and the process required to achieve it. This brings us to the issue of aims, or the purpose of our actions. Clausewitz examined the concepts of the defense and attack in terms of purpose and characteristic features. He concluded that the defense is the stronger form of war because it seeks to hold and preserve what already belongs to the defender.
Conversely, the attacker seeks to gain something that is not his.
Any omission or delay by the attacker gives the defender additional strength. However, the attacker possesses the positive aim because he seeks to achieve an end, to seize the initiative, to gain his objective. The defender possesses the negative aim because he seeks to preserve the status quo, to hold what is already his and deny it to the attacker. Defense is the stronger form of war, yet it pursues a negative aim. 7 Closely associated with the concept of aims is that of the culminating point. Nothing comes easily in war. As an attacker pursues his goal he expends his strength until he reaches a point of diminishing returns. This point is his culminating point; if he achieves his objective before reaching his culminating point, so much more is added to his credit. However, if he fails to attain his goal before reaching his culminating point, he must go over to the defense. At this point he also transitions from seeking a positive aim to pursuing a negative aim.
Culminating points also exist for those in the defense. If one is already in the defense, his culminating point is extremely critical because once he reaches it he can no longer exist in a cohesive fashion. His forces will fracture and fall in a piecemeal fashion. The Army leadership of today has expressed doubts about the applicability of Clausewitz. Much of their criticism is based on the notion that the future enemies facing the Army will be brutal criminals or mercenaries with allegiances to "anti-state" entities.
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Some believe the concept of the nation-state has outlived its usefulness and will devolve into religious or ethnic based groups.
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Van Creveld goes as far as to state that most military power is irrelevant in defending a nation-state's political interests today. He believes many nation-states, including the US, lack either the political willpower or the military capability to engage in a conflict without resorting to suicidal escalation. 13 In the end these critics foresee the death of the nation-state.
The Additionally, the US intends to execute its strategies to stabilize a region and return it to peaceful conditions by skillfully combining both PEO and PKO.
Joint Pub 3-07 describes six principles of MOOTW that are extensions of the basic doctrine described in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. 18 They are:
1)
Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
2)
Unity of effort. Seek unity of effort in every operation.
3)

Security.
Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.
4)
Restraint.
Apply appropriate military restraint prudently.
5)
Perseverance.
Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
6)
Legitimacy.
Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.
The objectives of PEO are to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support other instruments of national power, or end a "situation on favorable terms." The destructiveness of intrastate conflict tears at every bond in society.
There are two key distinctions of intrastate conflict. The use of military power in resolving value-based conflicts requires more time than required to resolve interestbased conflicts. 27 One only has to read the daily reports of brutal fighting in Burundi, Sri Lanka, Kashmir or Chechnya to comprehend the horrors and costs of value-based conflicts.
Clausewitz is instructive in these cases when one examines intrastate conflicts with the aid of his Paradoxical Trinity.
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Composed of the elements of blind natural force, chance and probability, and subordination to policy, this paradigm can aid us in understanding the phenomenon of intrastate conflict. Blind natural force involves the "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity" that Clausewitz associated with the nation-state's citizens. He saw the commander and military possessing the necessary skills to take advantage of chance and probability. Peace enforcement operations place the nation in a war because it has engaged another nation in a test of wills. In Clausewitz's terms, "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." 32 In today's international environment, we seek to limit how much a belligerent is our enemy in a PEO context through the use of rules of engagement and UN sanctioned mandates limiting the use of force. To the soldier on the ground or the airman in the sky, the risks they take in a PEO far exceed those of war in which exists a better clarity of purpose.
In a PEO, just when does the belligerent stop being an enemy? Some might answer that the belligerents are never the enemy because the PEO force acts with impartiality, treating both sides the same. 33 It is foolish to believe that the belligerent bombed and shelled into ceasing its offensive operations will consider the PEO force as impartial; they will comply with our directions because we hold a hammer over them.
While both PEO and war attempt to force our will on an opponent, the creation of such national will is difficult. Operational level commanders try to link these actions in a way that fulfills the goals assigned by the strategic leadership.
These windows can close as a result of delays, lack of instructions, or insufficient supporting action by another form of national power. Subsequent actions will fail to attain the desired end state because the PEO force will have exceeded its culminating point. Policy makers must ensure they do not allow the PEO effort to exceed this point and diminish its prospect of success.
The public views peace operations, of which PEO are a subset, as exercises in altruism based on good will and compassion. Usually misunderstood by the public is that any action by a PEO force providing aid to a belligerent in a failed state is considered a hostile act by all other belligerents. 36 Throughout the duration of a PEO, commanders must attempt to maintain a degree of impartiality although our doctrine admits that degree will be low. 37 Despite our belief in altruistic action and attempts to maintain an impartial attitude, the force of reciprocity will exert an influence on the operational environment. An established process effectively used by an interagency working group is an absolute necessity to achieve national objectives without slipping into a mid-intensity conflict or wallowing in a gradually escalating intervention. The group must use windows of opportunity as they appear, otherwise regional stability and peace will escape us.
This intricate application of power requires the process be in place before the need for applying that power arises. The executive branch of our government is responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs and executing its supporting policy.
Therefore, it must establish the process to assess the situation, At what point does a PEO, with all of its attending force structure, become a MRC? Can we realistically expect to withdraw forces from a PEO when a MRC arises, as PDD 25 suggests? Placing our young men and women in harm's way requires nothing less than a complete understanding by our leaders of the nature of intrastate conflict, peace enforcement operations, and the possible costs incurred to attain our ends.
